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The 2001 Nevada Redistricting and Perpetuation of the Status Quo
David F. Damore
Between 1990 and 2000 the population of Nevada increased by over 66 percent. Much of this
growth was fueled by an influx of minorities and further concentrated the state’s population in
southern Nevada. These forces altered the state’s political landscape and raised the stakes for the
decennial redistricting of Nevada’s assembly and senate seats. Employing a multi-methodological
approach, this effort demonstrates how the 2001 Nevada redistricting maintained the pre-existing
partisan divisions in the state legislature despite a number of factors that threatened to alter the status
quo. At the same time, the analysis reveals that the desire of key redistricters to maintain the partisan
status quo compromised the typical byproduct that results from bipartisan gerrymanders, incumbent
protection.

The unprecedented growth experienced in Nevada during the 1990s and
the further concentration of the state’s population in southern Nevada provided an opportunity for the 2001 redistricting to alter the existing distribution of power in the state legislature. However, after the 2002 state legislative elections, the status quo prevailed with the Democrats maintaining control of the state’s lower chamber and the Republicans holding their majority
in the upper house. Moreover, the partisan divisions in both chambers were
virtually unchanged even though the direct and indirect effects of redistricting left over a third of the seats contested in the November 2002 elections
without an incumbent.
Against this backdrop, this effort investigates how Nevada redistricters
were able to maintain the status quo in the Nevada legislature despite the
presence of numerous forces working against such an outcome. Specifically,
drawing on insights offered by prior research and employing a multimethodological approach (e.g., game theoretic precepts and descriptive and
quantitative analysis), the paper examines how partisan control of the state
senate and assembly was preserved; how partisan considerations undermined
incumbency protection; and how these considerations affected the 2002 state
legislative elections.
The paper is organized as follows. After a review of prior research and
a discussion of the context in which the 2001 Nevada redistricting took
______________
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place, a game theoretic set-up is used to analyze the affect that a number of
formal and informal constraints exerted on redistricting negotiations and
how redistricters were able to overcome these obstacles to preserve the partisan status quo. Next, data taken from the redistricting process is used to
examine the consequences that the shifting of legislative seats from northern
to southern Nevada had for incumbent protection. These data are then combined with data from the 2002 state legislative elections to assess how redistricting affected electoral outcomes in 2002. The paper concludes by integrating the paper’s findings into the broader literature.
Prior Research
The politics of redistricting have received ample attention in the literature and without equivocation this research suggests that redistricting
matters in that it affects the behavior of voters and legislators and influences
electoral and policy outcomes (Rush 1993). In seeking to understand the
particulars of redistricting, prior research has largely focused on how the
process is used for partisan advantage and/or incumbent protection and the
effect these considerations have for legislative responsiveness and partisan
bias.1
The work of Gelman and King (1994) provide a useful starting point
for assessing these dynamics. They suggest that redistricting is characterized
by conflict and uncertainty that bring the goals of parties, who desire an
increase in the number of seats held by their party, and incumbents, who are
primarily concerned with insulating themselves from electoral challenges,
into conflict.2 From their perspective, the key to understanding redistricting
is assessing the influence that formal and informal constraints exert on the
ability of redistricters to navigate the tension between these goals. To this
end, they contend that most plans result in compromises that weight “the
political party’s overall seat advantage most heavily” (542).
At the same time, other scholars suggest that the ability of parties to use
the redistricting process to enhance their electoral prospects is hindered by a
number of considerations. First, partisan plans are constrained by existing
boundary lines, the requirements of equal size, compactness and contiguity,
the need to insure representation of communities of interest, and the preferences of incumbents (see note two). In addition, the ability to implement
partisan gerrymanders is hindered by the existing partisan composition of
the state government. As the work of Cain (1985), Cox and Katz (1999),
McDonald (2004) and others suggest, parties are only able to implement
such plans when they control redistricting institutions. In contexts where
partisan control is split the typical outcome is a bipartisan compromise that
favors incumbent protection.
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Moreover, longitudinal analyses indicate that partisan advantages tend
to dissipate over time (e.g., Cain 1985; Squire 1985; Basehart and Comer
1991) because partisan gerrymanders require the majority party to spread its
voters as efficiently over as many districts as possible. This, in turn, increases the risk that controlling parties may cut their advantages too thin and
increase the vulnerability of formally safe incumbents (Cain 1985). As a
consequence, partisan gerrymanders may be undermined by small shifts in
district constituencies (Gopian and West 1984) or by short-term influences.
The literature largely has examined the consequences of redistricting in
terms of partisan bias (the degree to which seat distributions reflect aggregate vote totals) and legislative responsiveness (how the partisan composition of a legislature responds to shifts in voters’ preferences). Here, the
literature (e.g., Cain 1985; Gelman and King 1994; Cox and Katz 1999)
suggests that both bias and responsiveness are affected by the efficiency by
which voters are distributed across districts.
As noted above, when a controlling party seeks to implement a partisan
gerrymander, its incumbents must forego some protection so that the party
can distribute its voters so as to maximize its likelihood of winning the most
number of seats (Cain 1985). Plans of this type more efficiently distribute
the controlling party’s voters, while decreasing the efficiency of the noncontrolling party’s voters (who are packed into a smaller number of safe
seats). The net result is more marginal districts that, all else equal, are sensitive to fluctuations in voters’ preference (Cain 1985).3 Conversely, when
partisan control over redistricting is split it is unlikely that either party will
gain an advantage because doing so would require the consent of the opposition. As a consequence, these plans inefficiently distribute voters of both
parties by creating a large number of uncompetitive seats (Cox and Katz
1999). The end result is a decrease in legislative responsiveness (Cain 1985;
Cox and Katz 1999).
Not surprisingly, past research indicates that partisan gerrymanders
increase the potential for partisan bias (Gelman and King 1994; Cox and
Katz 1999). The literature assessing the consequences of bias under bipartisan plans, however, is less clear. For instance, Cox and Katz (1999)
suggest that the level of bias in such plans is affected by the parties’ assumptions about the relative share of the vote they expect to win and the nature of
the court action that may result from a redistricting challenge. Analyses of
bipartisan redistricting plans of state legislatures in the 1970s and 1980s
(e.g., Squire 1985; Niemi and Jackson 1991) find no systematic evidence of
bias.
The work of Gelman and King (1994) take a slightly different position on these issues. Specifically, they argue that because of the competing
goals of the key actors and the uncertain and conflictual context in which
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redistricting transpires, regardless of the shape of the plan, the net result is a
significant shaking-up of the political environment. This tumult, in turn,
tends to facilitate political renewal that may reduce partisan bias and increase responsiveness.
The Nevada Context
Formal and Informal Constraints
As is demonstrated below, many of these considerations as well as a
number of formal and informal constraints unique to the Nevada context
affected the 2001 Nevada redistricting. Perhaps the most important of these
considerations was the 66.3 percent increase in the state’s population during
the 1990s. The majority of this growth occurred in southern Nevada (e.g.,
Clark County), which saw its population increase by over 85 percent
between 1990 and 2000. Today, Clark County is home to nearly seven out of
10 Nevadans.
Of course, the presence of dramatic and asymmetrical growth does not
necessitate a threat to the existing distribution of political power. Rather, for
this expectation to have merit the preferences of the state’s new inhabitants
must differ from those of pre-existing residents. Unfortunately, the data
needed to evaluate this claim (e.g., a comparison of the voter registration of
new residents to those of existing residents) are not available. Evidence in
support of this point can be gleaned from inspection of the two party vote
distribution in the four most salient statewide races prior to the 2001 redistricting.4 The results of these races indicate that the vote distribution in
Nevada is anything but symmetrical as Democratic candidates receive anywhere from 11 to 27 percent more of the vote in Clark County as compared
to elsewhere in the state. Thus, given the surge in southern Nevada’s population and the disparity in voting patterns between southern Nevada and the
rest of the state, the 2001 redistricting provided an opportunity to alter existing power in the state legislature in a manner beneficial to the state’s Democrats.
A second constraint on the process was accommodating representation
for Nevada’s burgeoning Hispanic population (Nevada Legislative Counsel
Bureau 2001). Indeed, much of the state’s growth in the 1990s was fueled by
an influx of Hispanics. Whereas Hispanics constituted just over 10 percent
of the population in 1990, by 2000 Hispanics accounted for slightly less than
20 percent of the population with 75 percent of the state’s Hispanic population residing in Clark County.
A successful redistricting plan also needed to navigate a number of
structural constraints. Most notably, redistricters had to contend with the
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existing divisions within the state legislature.5 Moreover, while the Nevada
Constitution delegates near autonomy over redistricting to the state legislature (the governor may veto a plan), if the legislature is unable to reach an
agreement, then the judiciary could intervene. From the perspective of redistricters, judicial involvement would be problematic because any intervention
would be discretionary (e.g., the court’s could determine the conditions
under which a reversionary plan would be used, as well as the nature of the
reversion itself), as opposed to automatic (e.g., a prespecified plan that
would be implemented by a prespecified condition) (Cox and Katz 1999).
At the same time, three peculiarities to the process in Nevada provided
redistricters with latitude in crafting the final plan. First, the Nevada Constitution allows the size of the legislature to be expanded beyond its present 63
members. Second, Nevada does not require the contiguousness of assembly
seats within senate districts. That is, while senate seats have twice the population of assembly seats, two assembly seats are not required to correspond
to the boundaries of one senate seat. Rather, senate seats can be drawn
irrespective of the boundaries of the underlying assembly districts. Lastly,
Nevada allows for the creation of two-member districts in the state senate.
These districts contain twice as many citizens and are represented by two
members who compete in alternating elections.
Key Players and Interests
As specified by the Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau (2001), the
goal of the 2001 Nevada redistricting was to redraw legislative boundaries to
reflect changes in the state’s population and provide representation for the
state’s Hispanic community. In raw political terms, redistricting would
determine partisan control of the state’s legislative chambers, as well as
which incumbents would be protected. Two side payments also were linked
to the state legislative redistricting: the level of funding for Nevada State
College at Henderson, the “pet project” of Assembly Speaker Richard Perkins, and the drawing of the boundaries for the state’s newly apportioned
House seat.
The key actors in the 2001 redistricting in Nevada were Assembly
Speaker Perkins and Senate Majority Leader Bill Raggio. The interests of
the two players capture the prevailing cleavages in Nevada politics. Whereas
Perkins is a Democrat and leader of the legislature’s lower chamber, Raggio
is Republican and controls the upper house. Perkins comes from urban,
Clark County in southern Nevada, while Raggio is the legislature’s dominant
voice for northern and rural interests. As a consequence and to the chagrin of
many rank and file members, Perkins and Raggio acted as the de facto negotiators for their respective parties, chambers, and geographic interests.
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As noted above, the ability of redistricters to use the process to their
advantage is limited by formal and informal constraints (e.g., Gelman and
King 1994). In the case of Nevada, the state’s population growth and increased concentration in southern Nevada provided Perkins with an advantage. Regardless of the outcome, southern Nevada would gain seats. The
collective preferences of the citizens, however, worked to Raggio’s advantage. Although the state is evenly split in terms of Republican and Democratic registration, Republicans win most statewide races and in the
aggregate, outpoll Democrats in state legislative races.
At the outset of negotiations, the affect of the other constraints outlined
above was unclear. On the one hand, the divided control of the Nevada
legislature could facilitate a stalemate. At the same time, the uncertainty
associated with judicial intervention if an agreement could not be reached
created an incentive for the players to reach a compromise (Cox and Katz
1999).6 Lastly, the peculiarities of Nevada’s redistricting institutions (e.g.,
the non-contiguity of assembly and senate districts, multi-member senate
districts, and the ability to alter the size of the legislature) provided redistricters with flexibility in drawing senate and assembly seats. At the same
time, these considerations increased uncertainty about the contours of the
final plan.
Partisan Protection
Game theoretic precepts are used examine the affect that partisan considerations had on redistricting negotiations.7 Specifically, the process is
conceptualized as a two player mixed-motive game.8 Such an approach
assumes that players’ behavior is shaped by competitive and complimentary
considerations and allows side payments to factor into players’ decision
making.9 In the context of interest here, the players had complimentary goals
in passing a plan that would not solicit judicial intervention and competing
interests in passing a plan that would reflect their preferences.
Thus, given the preferences of the redistricting architects and the informal and formal constraints outlined above, six potential outcomes may
have resulted from redistricting negotiations: maintenance of the partisan
status quo of either an expanded or non-expanded legislature or unified
Republican or Democratic control of either an expanded or non-expanded
legislature. Table 1 summarizes these outcomes and the preference orderings
of the players over the partisan and expansion.
The players’ preferences over the partisan dimension are straightforward. Both Perkins and Raggio ideal outcomes would be a legislature
controlled by Democrats and Republicans respectively. The players’ preferences over the expansion issue, however, require elaboration. In supporting a
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Table 1. Potential Outcomes for 2001 Nevada Redistricting
and Preference Orderings of Legislative Leaders
Outcome
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Perkins
Preference Ranking

Democratic control of legislature.
Democratic control of expanded legislature.
Partisan status quo.
Partisan status quo, expanded legislature.
Republican control of legislature.
Republican control of expanded legislature.

1
2
3
4
5
6

Raggio
Preference Ranking
6
5
4
3
2
1

six seat expansion of the legislature, Raggio argued that doing so would
allow the seats of northern incumbents to be preserved and allow more manageable sized districts to be drawn for rural legislators (Morrison 2001b).
Conversely, even though Clark County would receive 69 percent of the seats
under both an expanded and non-expanded legislature, Perkins was against
expansion. He believed that southern Nevada would be better served by
concentrating power in fewer hands (Morrison 2001b).
Not surprisingly, the players initially put forth plans that would maximize their preferences: Perkins and the Democrats presented a plan that
would facilitate outcome A, a non-expanded legislature where both
chambers were likely to be controlled by the Democrats, while Raggio and
the GOP countered with a plan that would likely lead to outcome F, an
expanded legislature with unified Republican control.10 However, neither of
these outcomes nor outcomes B and E were feasible because they would
require a chamber majority to vote against its interest.
As a consequence, a second iteration of the game was played with the
feasible set of outcomes reduced to either outcome C, perpetuation of the
partisan status quo (a win for Perkins) or outcome D, perpetuation of the
partisan status quo in an expanded legislature (a win for Raggio). The initial
compromise between the leaders resulted in outcome D, a win for Raggio
because he would preserve his chamber majority and be able to protect
northern incumbents.11 However, because of concerns about the pro-GOP
nature of the drawing of the state’s new House seat, the deal fell apart,
necessitating an additional iteration of the game. In nixing the deal, Perkins
argued that “I still have no desire to grow this legislature, so if it’s going to
happen, I have to benefit somehow, and we’ve seen no benefit” (Morrison
2001c).
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The inability to sustain the agreement over outcome D illustrates the
difficulty of obtaining a stable outcome in a mixed-motive setting. Because
the players’ payoffs are variable and therefore, the motives underlying their
actions differ, each player is responding to a disparate mix of competitive
and complimentary incentives. Raggio had more to lose and hence more to
protect, while Perkins would gain with either outcome C or D because irrespective of the size of the legislature southern Nevada would gain seats.
These asymmetries in payoffs did not allow the agreement for outcome D to
be sustained because to do so would have required Perkins to either adjust
his perceptions of the payoffs or alter his incentives to coordinate his actions
with Raggio’s.
In the third round of play, which transpired under the drama of a
special session, Raggio dropped his demand for an expanded legislature.12 In
so doing, Raggio altered his and Perkins’ perceptions of the game. Whereas
Perkins continued to see the game as a variable sum game, Raggio was faced
with a situation that resembled a zero sum game: whatever he lost, Perkins
would gain. This shift, in turn, caused Raggio to support outcome C, which
maximized Perkins’ minimum gain while minimizing Raggio’s maximum
loss. In addition, both players received their side payments with Raggio
benefiting from a pro-Republican drawing of the new House seat and
Perkins gaining funding for the state’s new college.
While the game theoretic analysis is useful for understanding the broad
contours of the 2001 Nevada redistricting, it fails to reveal the specifics by
which the partisan status quo was maintained. To better understand these
dynamics Table 2 summarizes the distribution of seats in terms of the percent difference in Democratic and Republican voter registration. In the
assembly, seats range from +41.69% Democrat to +30.25% Republican. In
the senate, seats range from +40.53% Democrat to +19% Republican.
As such, these data suggest two important conclusions. First, because
partisan packing was the means by which outcome C was realized, it appears
that there is little opportunity for the minority party to gain control of either
chamber. This is most obvious in the senate where Democratic seats all have
values greater than 10 percent and no seats were drawn with slight Democratic advantages. Of the three senate seats that might be considered competitive (those in the zero to +5% Republican column), two of those seats are
in two-member districts, which as discussed below insulate incumbents from
serious opposition. In the assembly, the Democrats were drawn 21 safe seats
and the Republicans 12, leaving only nine seats (those in the zero to 5%
Democrat and 0 to 5% Republican columns) marginally competitive.
Second, by focusing attention on maintaining the partisan status quo,
the plan provided little opportunity for Hispanics to gain a foothold in state
politics. Despite energetic lobbying on behalf of Hispanic interests and a
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Table 2. Partisan Difference in Voter Registration
for Redistricted Assembly and Senate Seats
>+15.1%
Dem

+10.1
to 15%
Dem

+5.1
to 10%
Dem

9

4

8

5

4

0

0 to
+5%
Dem

0 to
+5%
Rep

+5.1
to 10%
Rep

+10.1
to 15%
Rep

>+15.1%
Rep

Assembly (n = 42)
5
4

0

5

7

Senate (n = 21)
0
3

4

3

2

Note: Data taken from Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau Redistricting Reports.

directive by the Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau (2001) that the plan
provide representation for Hispanics, only two assembly and one senate seat
were drawn with Hispanic populations greater that 60 percent and only one
of these seats was drawn as open. Exactly why this occurred was the source
of a good deal of post hoc finger pointing between Republicans and Democrats. The likely culprit, however, was the Hispanics who by courting both
parties in hopes of getting the best deal failed to solidify their efforts behind
a single plan. As Ryan Erwin, a Republican operative involved in the process explained, the Hispanics “organized well, but they weren’t good at
decision making” (Morrison 2001e).
Incumbent Protection
As detailed above, the 2001 Nevada redistricting maintained the partisan status quo via a bipartisan gerrymander. However, because of uneven
growth patterns during the prior decade and the decision of redistricters to
maintain the size of the legislature, the plan necessitated the movement of
seats from northern to southern Nevada. Specifically, three assembly and
one senate seat were moved from northern to southern Nevada. The plan
also created six open seats in the assembly and one in the senate. The practical consequence of this decision was that incumbent protection, the typical
byproduct of bipartisan gerrymanders, was compromised as the plan dislocated six assembly incumbents and one senate incumbent.13
The asymmetry in the ability of redistricters to protect senate and
assembly incumbents demonstrates the importance of the peculiarities of
Nevada’s redistricting institutions (e.g., multi-member districting and noncontiguousness between assembly and senate seats) for protecting senate
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incumbents. For those senate incumbents who are drawn into multi-member
districts they are effectively insulated from serious electoral challenges because any challenger would be required to compete for the support of twice
as many voters in districts that are already drawn in favor of the incumbent’s
party. Multi-member districts also provide collective benefits for all senate
incumbents because the creation of two two-member senate districts requires
a 19 way, as opposed to 21 way, division of the electorate. This, coupled
with the lack of a requirement that the boundaries for senate seats correspond to the underlying assembly districts, allows the preferences of senate
incumbents to be easily accommodated. As a consequence, only one senate
incumbent, a northern Nevada Republican lost his seat and was drawn into
the district of another GOP incumbent. To offset the loss of the northern
GOP seat, an open seat was created in southern Nevada with a partisan
registration difference of +5.89 percent Republican.
The analysis presented in the top panel of Table 3 empirically demonstrates these processes at work. Using data taken from the Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau’s Redistricting Reports, the table presents the analysis
of variance and difference of means for the senate redistricting. The dependent variable is the percent difference in Democratic and Republican voter
registration in each senate seat and the independent variable is the partisanship of the incumbent drawn into the district. Turning first to the overall
performance of the model, the value of the F statistic indicates that the
between group differences in the partisan composition of the three district
types are statistically significant and the eta squared value suggests that over
81 percent of the variance in the dependent variable is accounted for by
differences in the independent variable. As expected, difference of means
tests for the three district types indicate that the partisan registration difference for the seats drawn for Democratic incumbents are significantly
different from the open seat and the seats drawn for Republican incumbents.
There is no significant difference in the partisan registration difference
between the open seat and the Republican seats (as noted above, the open
seat was drawn to offset the loss of a GOP seat in northern Nevada).
Thus, while the peculiarities of multi-member districting and the lack
of contiguousness between senate and assembly seats allowed the senate to
largely avoid dislocation of its incumbents, the same did not occur in the
assembly. To balance the distribution of assembly seats with the growth in
southern Nevada, the redistricting plan created six open seats in Clark
County. To offset the creation of the new seats in southern Nevada, two sets
of Democratic incumbents and two sets of Republican incumbents were
drawn into the same districts and two districts were drawn with both Republican and Democratic incumbents.14

2001 Nevada Redistricting and Perpetuation of Status Quo | 159
Table 3. Analysis of Variance and Difference of Means Tests
for 2001 Redistricting of the Nevada Legislature

Seat Type

Mean
Registration
Difference

Number
of
Observations

+10.38% Rep.
+20.45% Dem.
+5.89% Rep.

11
9
1

+15.02 Rep.
+12.15 Dem.
+7.15 Dem.

11
23
6

+10.69 Dem.

2

Senate
A. Republican Incumbent(s) Drawn Into Seat B
B. Democratic Incumbent Drawn Into Seat A
C. Open Seat B
F = 38.66, p<.001
Eta-squared = .811
Assembly
A.
B.
C.
D.

Republican Incumbent(s) Drawn Into Seat B, C
Democratic Incumbent(s) Drawn Into Seat A
Open Seat A
Republican and Democratic Incumbents
Drawn Into Seat

F = 10.50, p <.001
Eta squared = .453
Note: Subscripts indicate statistically significant difference between group means, p<.001. level.

The bottom portion of Table 3, which presents the analysis of variance
and difference of means for the assembly redistricting, captures these
dynamics. Consistent with the results for the senate analysis, the F statistic
indicates that the between group differences in the partisan composition of
the four district types are statistically significant. The value of the eta
squared statistic suggests that 45 percent of the variance in the partisan
registration of the assembly districts is accounted for by the independent
variable. The smaller eta square value for the assembly model reflects the
weakened relationship between incumbent partisanship and constituent
registration discussed above. Difference of means tests for the seat types
indicate that the partisan registration difference for the seats drawn for
Republican incumbents are significantly different from the open seats and
the seats drawn for Democratic incumbents. The other differences of means
are statistically insignificant suggesting no systematic differences between
these seat types.
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Redistricting and the 2002 Nevada Legislative Elections
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Gelman and King 1996; Kousser
1996; Desposato and Petrocik 2003), the implementation of the 2001 redistricting plan in Nevada had both direct and indirect effects on the subsequent
legislative elections. The direct effects of redistricting, which are examined
below, stem from the advantage that incumbents gain by competing in districts that are packed with partisan. The indirect effects of redistricting result
from the influence that new boundaries exert on incumbents’ assessments of
their electoral futures.
To this end, prior to the 2002 state legislative elections a significant
number of legislative incumbents chose not to defend their seats. Specifically, four assembly and two senate incumbents chose to seek alternative
offices instead of run for reelection. An additional four assembly incumbents
chose to retire instead of run in districts that were drawn in a manner unfavorable to their reelection goals. In two of these cases, GOP assembly
incumbents opted not to run in districts into which another incumbent had
been drawn. Similarly, two Democratic assembly incumbents who had been
drawn into Republican majority districts (+.9 and +15.6% GOP registration
advantages) decided to retire instead of compete as minority candidates. In
addition, four assembly incumbents lost in the primaries. The net result was
that 14 of the 42 assembly seats and four of the 11 senate seats contested in
2002 featured no incumbent.15
The existence of so many open seats in 2002 provided yet another
opportunity to alter the status quo in the state legislature. Indeed, some observers felt that the open seats in the senate provided the Democrats with a
legitimate chance to gain control of the upper chamber and in so doing, oust
long standing Majority Leader Bill Raggio, who over his career had done
everything possible to stifle the interests of southern Nevada (Bowers 1996).
However, after the ballots had been counted, Republicans maintained their
12 to nine majority in the senate and consistent with the GOP surge in 2002,
the Democrats lost two seats in the assembly, reducing their majority from
25–17 to 23–19.
A closer inspection of the results of the 2002 legislative elections
demonstrate the direct influence that redistricting had on the state’s electoral
dynamics. In only three of the 44 contested state legislative races did the
candidate whose party had a deficit in voter registration win. In one of these
races a one-term assembly Democratic incumbent lost her seat by 36 votes
to a three-term GOP incumbent who had been drawn into the district. In the
second of these contests a Democratic incumbent held her seat despite competing in a district with a GOP registration advantage of 2.91 percent. In the
third of these races a northern Democratic incumbent lost her seat by 469
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votes despite a Democratic registration advantage of just over 2 percent. All
of the open seats races were won by the candidate whose party held the
registration advantage.
To further demonstrate the direct effects of redistricting on the 2002
state legislative elections Table 4 presents the results of an OLS regression
analysis for the 44 contested legislative districts.16 The model’s dependent
variable is the Democratic share of the two party vote as reported by the
Nevada Secretary of State’s Office. The primary independent variable
(Registration Difference) is the district partisan registration difference used
above. Dummy variables for Democratic incumbents, open seat contests,
and assembly races also are included in the model.
The results of the analysis are consistent with the above observations.
Specifically, the r-squared value indicates that over 40 percent of the variance in the dependent variable can be accounted for by the independent variables included in the model and the MSE statistic indicates that the model
does an adequate job in predicting values of the dependent variable.
Turning next to the performance of the model’s independent variables,
the coefficient and significance for Registration Difference suggest that
each increase in a party’s registration increases its vote share by .5 percent
above the constant. The statistical insignificance of Democratic Incumbent
Table 4. OLS Analysis of the Affect of Redistricting on the
2002 Nevada Legislative Races
Independent Variable
Registration Difference
Democratic Incumbent
Open Seat
Assembly
Constant
Number of observations
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Root MSE
*p<.05; **p<.01; **p<.001 one-tailed test

Coefficient
(standard error)
.515**
(.191)
.467
(6.11)
-9.46*
(5.18)
5.17
(3.75)
51.2***
(5.10)
44
.48
.42
9.79
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suggests that these incumbents are not rewarded with an additional boost in
the vote. The performance of this variable, however, is not surprising given
that so many of the districts were drawn with such large partisan registration
majorities that any advantages that incumbents may enjoy was mitigated by
the partisan distribution of their districts. The significance and sign of Open
Seat indicates that Republicans were more likely to do better in those seats
(in the assembly the GOP won nine of the 14 open seats and three of four of
the senate open seats). However, given that many of the open seats were
drawn to offset the loss of districts formally held by northern Republicans,
the variable’s performance is consistent with expectations. Finally, the lack
of significance for Assembly suggests that there is no systematic different in
voting patterns between senate and assembly races. In sum, the model indicates that the outcomes of the 2002 legislative elections were largely shaped
by the decisions made during the 2001 redistricting negotiations.
Discussion and Conclusions
The 2001 redistricting of the Nevada legislature provided an opportunity to reapportion representation in response to the state’s tremendous
population growth and continued concentration in southern Nevada during
the prior decade. Consistent with these growth patterns, the primary consequence of the 2001 redistricting was an increase in the representation of
southern Nevada at the expense of northern and rural interests. Also, the
shift in seats from northern to southern Nevada necessitated that the electoral
safety of some incumbents be compromised. However, beyond these considerations, the redistricting plan was most notable for its perpetuation of the
status quo. Indeed, while the plan either directly or indirectly facilitated a
large number of open seats, the manner in which legislative leaders drew
seat boundaries decreased the likelihood that the partisan control of either
chamber would be altered—a point affirmed by the outcome of the 2002
state legislative elections.
As such, the machinations that permeated the 2001 legislative redistricting in Nevada were consistent with extant literature indicating the importance of institutional procedures and other formal and informal constraints for understanding redistricting outcomes. As suggested by the work
of Cain (1994), Cox and Katz (1999), McDonald (2004) and others, the split
partisan control over the redistricting process in Nevada prohibited redistricting architects from implementing a partisan gerrymander. Instead, legislative leaders were forced to compromise on a bipartisan gerrymander that
preserved the partisan distributions in the senate and assembly. At the same
time, Perkins’ refusal to expand the size of the legislature undermined the
typical byproduct of bipartisan gerrymanders, incumbent protection. Indeed,
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consistent with the work Gelman and King (1994), it appears that in the case
of Nevada in 2001 partisan and to a lesser extent geographic considerations
trumped concerns about incumbent protection and providing representation
for Nevada’s Hispanic community.
The analysis also reveals that the peculiarities of Nevada’s redistricting
institutions played important roles in shaping the eventual outcome. As
detailed above, the ability to expand the size of the legislature added an
additional and highly contentious dimension to redistricting negotiations that
became an important bargaining chip that redistricters were able to use to
obtain their desired side payments. The use of multi-member districts and
the lack of contiguousness between senate and assembly seats also proved to
be important mechanisms for protecting senate incumbents.
The substantive consequences of the 2001 Nevada redistricting also are
consistent with prior research on at least three fronts. First, as suggested by
Gelman and King (1994) and others, the primary effect of redistricting is a
substantial shaking-up of the political environment. This was certainly the
case in Nevada where redistricting helped to facilitate a large number of
open seat races in 2002. At the same time, the outcomes of the 2002 state
legislative elections reveal that the intentions of the redistricters were fulfilled as partisan registration differences were the dominant explanatory
variable of district level voting in the 2002 legislative elections (Kousser
1996). Moreover, the inability of redistricters to accommodate Hispanics
during the redistricting process translated into a poor showing for Hispanics
in 2002. As noted above, Hispanics compromise nearly 20 percent of the
state’s population, but after the 2002 state legislative elections held only 5
percent of the seats and Hispanics failed to win either of the two assembly
seats with Hispanic populations exceeding 60 percent.
Second, the Nevada case is consistent with the equivocation in the literature (e.g., Cox and Katz 1999) regarding the level of partisan bias under
bipartisan plans. Specifically, while assembly Democrats continue to exert
majority control to a degree that exceeds their share of the aggregate vote,
the 2002 assembly elections suggest that redistricting did not insulate the
chamber from challenges from the minority party. Consistent with the strong
showing of Republicans nationwide in 2002, the Republicans were able to
pick up two seats in the lower chamber. In the senate, the 2002 elections
served to maintain the GOP advantage at a level consistent with the aggregate vote.
Lastly, prior research (e.g., Cain 1985; Cox and Katz 1999) suggests
that the main casualty of bipartisan gerrymanders is responsiveness. This
tends to be the case because plans of this type pack voters into legislative
districts based upon party registration. This formula yields a large number of
safe seats for each party and few competitive districts. As a consequence,
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while incumbents do not have to worry about losing in the general election,
they do need to be concerned with primary challenges from their parties’
fringes. These dynamics, in turn, can create a disincentive for legislators to
compromise and moderate if doing so is likely to draw an inter-party challenge. The end result is likely to be increased partisan polarization and gridlock and less responsiveness.
The debate over a proposed tax increase that dominated the postredistricting legislative session provides an example of these processes at
work. In response to a proposed billion dollar tax increase by Republican
Governor Kenny Guinn, the state legislature was unable to reach an agreement over the amount of the increase or the entities that would be taxed.
This stalemate persisted despite agreement among Democrats and Republicans that some increase was needed and polls showing that a majority of
voters favored increasing government spending, particularly on education.17
Despite a myriad of proposals and counter-proposals, the debate over taxes
was not resolved during the regular legislative session or during the first of
two special sessions. Only after a second special session and judicial intervention by both federal and state courts did the legislature reach a compromise. While blame for the impasse was directed at a number of individuals and interests, certainly the disincentives for moderation and compromise that the 2001 redistricting facilitated hindered the ability of legislatures to find common ground and respond to the demands of their
constituents (Damore 2003).
While the short term consequences of the 2001 redistricting largely
played out as expected, the long-term consequences for Nevada’s future are
less clear. Most notably, as Nevada continues to grow and population gains
in southern Nevada outpace those in the rest of the seat, the state’s political
landscape may be further altered along two dimensions. First, given that
over 70 percent of all Democrats in Nevada live in southern Nevada and
assuming that future growth mirrors this trend, Nevada may move from a
state that leans Republican to one that leans Democratic. Second, projecting
to 2011, a continuation in the state’s growth patterns will lead to an even
greater concentration of southern Nevada’s power in the legislature at the
continued expense of northern and rural interests. Indeed, unless the legislature expands, rural members will have to represent larger geographic areas,
while the districts of their southern counterparts will become more plentiful
and more concentrated. All of this, in turn, should make for an even more
spirited redistricting debate in 2011.
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NOTES
1
Another vein of research focuses on the relationship between race and redistricting
(e.g., Brace, Grofman, and Handley 1987; Bullock 1995; Canon 1999; Cameron, Epstein,
and O’Halloran 1996). However, because the concerns of this literature are tangential to
this effort, it is not reviewed here.
2
Gelman and King (1994) further posit that incumbents may be concerned with
excluding prospective challengers from their districts, insuring that important donors are
drawn into their districts, and avoiding dislocation of core supporters. Also, while in
principle incumbents may be supportive of using redistricting to increase the number of
seats held by co-partisans they may be less willing to do so if such plans compromise
their individual security.
3
As Niemi and Jackman (1991) note, it is this very consideration that may cause
controlling parties, even if they are able to implement partisan gerrymanders, from maximizing this potential because doing so increases the party’s uncertainty of maintaining its
existing majority over the life of a redistricting plan.
4
The four races are the 2000 presidential election, the 2000 and 1998 United States
senate elections, and the 1998 gubernatorial election.
5
Prior to redistricting, Democrats held a 27 to 15 advantage in the assembly and
Republicans had a 12 to nine majority in the senate. Assembly members serve for two
year and state senators serve for four year with half of the senate seats up for election
every two years. Senate seats contain twice as many citizens as assembly districts.
6
If redistricting ended up in court, presumably over a dispute about expansion of
the legislature, Perkins felt that the Democrats would have the upper hand. Specifically,
Perkins suggested that “if it goes to the courts, I think we’re in a better position than the
Republicans are, first and foremost, because I don’t believe the courts have the authority
to expand, and secondly because we believe the case law supports this going to the
(Nevada) Supreme Court rather than federal court”(Morrison 2001a).
7
Game theory models the influence that interdependent decision making and structural considerations have on the behavior of political actors. Game theory is deductively
based and operationalized using formal modeling techniques. However, a formal model
of the negotiations between legislative leaders is not developed here. Rather, the logic of
game theory and its underlying assumption of rationality are used to structure a descriptive analysis of this process. The rationality assumption posits that actors have goals that
they attempt to achieve through their actions; that actors’ choices about how to achieve
those goals are constrained by the decision making structure; and that actors’ choose
actions that they believe will best achieve their goals (Morrow 1994).
8
Mixed motive games are a type of nonzero-sum game that assumes that players’
payoffs are variable. In contrast, the more ubiquitous zero sum framework assumes that
what is lost by one player is gained by the other. Although the solutions to nonzero-sum
games tend to be less compelling than those in zero-sum games, these games provide a
more realistic representation of complex political situations because they allow players to
have both competitive and complementary interests (Brams 1975).
9
More specifically, the redistricting process is conceptualized as a non-cooperative
game, which does not allow players to make binding agreements. Rather, in non-cooperative games players must enforce any coordination through the game itself. In cooperative
games, it is easier for players to make agreements because players are able to bind themselves to agreements that may not be enforceable. In making this assumption, cooperative
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games assume away the key questions of when, how, and why players will cooperate for
their mutual benefit (Morrow 1994).
10
The assembly redistricting bill (AB 665) apportioned 29 of 42 assembly seats and
14 of 21 senate seats in Clark County with a majority of seats in both chambers drawn to
the advantage of Democrats. The plan also created two majority Hispanic assembly seats
and one majority Hispanic senate seat. Because the plan did not expand the size of the
legislature, it placed eight assembly and three senate incumbents into the same districts,
the majority of whom were Republicans. The senate redistricting bill (SB 575) sought to
offset any loss of seats from northern to southern Nevada by expanding the legislature
from 63 to 69 seats (46 assembly and 23 senate seats) with a majority of seats in both
chambers having a pro-GOP bias. In so doing, the plan allowed rural lawmakers to keep
their seat by creating new districts in southern Nevada. The Republican plan also called
for three Democratic senate incumbents to compete in a two-member district in Clark
County and created four assembly districts that forced eight Democratic incumbents to
compete against one another.
11
The compromise would expand the senate from 21 to 23 (13 favorable to Republicans and 10 favorable to the Democrats) seats and the assembly from 42 to 46 (29
Democratic leaning seats and 17 districts favorable to the GOP). The plan also added new
seats in Clark County, which allowed northern incumbents to keep their seats and sought
to give Hispanics representation in both chambers (Morrison 2001d).
12
As a small-government Republican, Raggio did not want to be responsible for
increasing the size of the legislature (even if doing so would allow him to protect northern incumbents) and he was under pressure from the Republicans in Washington D.C. to
holdout for a drawing of Nevada’s new House seat that would be more favorable to the
GOP (Morrison 2001d).
13
The 2001 plan also reduced the number of two-member senate districts from five
to two.
14
Consistent with the skullduggery that is a hallmark of redistricting politics, decisions about which incumbents would be sacrificed was not randomly determined. Instead,
those incumbents who received unfavorable treatment during the redistricting process felt
that they were being punished for unpopular stands. For example, two northern Nevada
Republicans, Don Gustavson and Sharron Angle, who were drawn into the districts of
other incumbents, felt that this decision was directly attributable to their vote against a
“pet project” of Senate Majority Leader Bill Raggio. As Gustavson explained, “Sharron
and I got the shaft. We didn’t vote for the good old boys, and now they are making it
tough on us” (Ryan 2003).
15
Four assembly Republicans, one senate Republican, three assembly Democrats,
and one senate Democrat (competing in a two member district) ran unopposed. The failure of the opposition party to field candidates in these races suggests that the party’s were
behaving strategically as in all but two of these districts, the party holding the seat held
registration advantages in excess of 14 percent. Because of the lack of competition for
these seats, they are not included in the analysis below.
16
Prior research utilizes a variety of approaches to assess the affect of redistricting
on electoral outcomes. Unfortunately, as Kousser (1996) discusses, many of these
approaches are problematic. For instance, the reliability of indirect measures of partisan
gerrymandering such as compactness is questionable at best. Others measures provide
little insight into the intentions of redistricters because they employ data not available at
the time of redistricting (i.e., measures of partisan bias that unfold over the life of a
redistricting plan). Perhaps the most commonly used indicator to measure the consequences of redistricting, variants of the seats/votes ratio, which examine the relationship
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between aggregate (statewide) votes and seat totals, are problematic for at least two
reasons. First, even though legislative seats are allocated based upon population such
measures rely on votes, which are determined by a variety of factors (i.e., the socioeconomic status of voters, candidates spending, competitiveness, etc.). Second, such
measures assume that shifts in the aggregate vote should correspond to aggregate shifts in
the parties’ shares of seats in a legislature. However, as Kousser notes, small shifts in the
aggregate “do not push an otherwise losing candidate over the threshold of a plurality of
a district, which is the much more relevant statistic for actual politics” (537). In light of
these concerns, Kousser (1996) argues for using a measure of partisan registration to
assess the consequences of redistricting. Indeed, using such a measure, he is able to predict nearly 90 percent of the winners in California assembly and congressional contests
between 1970 and 1994. Methodologically, such a measure is advantageous for at least
three reasons: it provides a direct measure of partisan gerrymandering; it utilizes information available at the time of redistricting and hence, captures the intent of redistricting
architects; and by using individual districts as the unit of analysis, the measure eliminates
the issues involved with aggregation. For these reasons, I utilize a variation of Kousser’s
model here.
17
These same polls also indicated that Nevadans were less supportive of any tax
increases and instead, preferred to pass the tax burden on to the state’s nearly forty
million annual visitors.
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